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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Millions of people are transgendered1 and cannot easily be categorized 
as either male or female.  Similarly, millions of people are multiracial 
and cannot be classified as being of one distinct race.  Race classification 
systems have existed for centuries and have been the subject of 
extensive commentary and critique for decades.  Sex and gender 
classification systems, on the other hand, have just started to become the 
subject of litigation in the last half of the twentieth century2 and it is only 
during the last decade that sex classification systems have become the 
topic of extensive scholarly discussion.3 
 
 1. Not all institutions use the terms transgendered, transsexual, and intersexual 
consistently.  In this Article, these terms have the following meanings: An intersexual is 
someone who is born with biological sex indicators that are not all clearly male or 
clearly female.  In other words, an incongruence in sex indicators exists at birth among 
an intersexual’s chromosomes, gonads, genitalia, internal sex organs, hormones, or 
phenotype.  A transsexual is someone whose known biological sex markers are all 
congruent at birth, but who has a gender self-identity that does not conform to these 
biological factors.  Some transsexuals undergo surgical and hormonal treatment to bring 
their bodies into conformity with their gender self-identity.  Individuals who undergo 
surgical and hormonal treatment have all congruent sex indicators except for their 
chromosomes.  Other transsexuals undergo hormonal treatment so that their secondary 
sex characteristics (for example, facial hair for men and breasts for women) match their 
gender identity, but their other sex markers remain unchanged.  Transgendered 
individuals include intersexuals, transsexuals, and anyone else who crosses traditional 
sex and gender boundaries. 
 2. Corbett v. Corbett, 1971 P. 83 (Eng. 1970), was the first decision to address 
this issue.  Since 1970, dozens of cases have been brought to determine how 
transgendered people should be legally classified.  For a summary of these cases, see 
Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between 
Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 299–325 (1999). 
 3. See, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual 
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 
1 (1995); Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered People and Same-Sex 
Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. (1998); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of 
Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 
(1995); Greenberg, supra note 2; Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and 
Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” 
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The purpose of this Article is to explore whether the more developed 
theoretical critiques of race classification systems and their effect on 
multiracials can be used to help illuminate some of the theoretical and 
practical problems that may arise as legal institutions struggle with how 
to classify transgendered people.  Sex and race classification systems are 
clearly not completely analogous because of the strong biological basis 
to sex determination, the ability of sexual minorities4 to hide their sexual 
identity and, most importantly, our history of slavery, which so profoundly 
shaped race relations in this country.  Despite these differences, racial 
and sexual minorities have been subjected to similar discriminatory 
treatment and have been historically categorized in similar ways.  
Therefore, legal institutions, activists, and scholars who are contributing 
to the current debate about sex classification systems can learn from the 
experience of racial minorities and from race scholars who have 
provided extensive analysis of the effects of race classification systems. 
During the past decade, the legal implications of being transgendered 
have been examined by courts,5 legislatures,6 legal scholars,7 and 
activists.8  One of the issues that scholars and activists who work in this 
 
in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
 4. The term “sexual minorities” refers to anyone who does not fit traditional 
norms of sex, gender, gender identity, or sexual orientation.  Therefore, in this Article 
the term includes gays, lesbians, bisexuals, transsexuals, and intersexuals. 
 5. See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 299–325 (discussing these cases in detail). 
 6. Numerous state legislatures have enacted statutes that control the legal 
classification of transsexuals on their official documents.  See Greenberg, supra note 
2, at 308–10.  For a detailed discussion of this legislation, see also PAISLEY CURRAH 
& SHANNON MINTER, NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A 
HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS (2000), available at http://www.ncl 
rights.org/publications/pubs/transeq.pdf (last visited July 25, 2002); WAYNE VAN DER 
MEIDE, NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, LEGISLATING EQUALITY, available at 
http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/legeq99.pdf (last visited July 25, 2002).  Other state 
legislatures have not passed legislation addressing this issue. 
 7. See supra note 3. 
 8. A number of organizations have formed to protect and advance the rights of 
intersexuals and transsexuals.  See, e.g., Phyllis Randolph Frye, Facing Discrimination, 
Organizing for Freedom: The Transgender Community, in CREATING CHANGE™: 
SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY AND CIVIL RIGHTS 451, 460–67 (John D’Emilio et al. eds., 
2000); Intersex Society of North America, What Is This About, at http://www.isna.org 
(last visited July 25, 2002).  Based on the work of a number of activist organizations, 
some legislatures have adopted statutes to provide greater protection to transgendered 
people and the issue has received more coverage in the mainstream press in such 
publications as the Wall Street Journal, Newsweek, and the New York Times, and 
television programs such as ABC: 20/20 and Discovery Channel. Geoffrey Cowley, 
Gender Limbo, NEWSWEEK, May 19, 1997, at 64, available at 1997 WL 9315806; Mary 
Flood, Court Is Asked to Develop a Gender Test, WALL ST. J. (Texas), Sept. 15, 1999, at 
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area struggle with is whether to accept the traditional binary sex 
classification system or instead push for a deconstruction of the binary 
sex and gender categories.  The former approach would require courts 
and legislatures to choose a sex feature (for example, chromosomes, 
genitalia, phenotype, or gender self-identity) that would determine a person’s 
legal sex.  Under this system, legal institutions could be encouraged to 
adopt gender self-identity as the factor that would best protect the rights 
of transgendered individuals.9  The second approach, deconstructing binary 
sex categories, would protect transgendered individuals more effectively; 
however, convincing courts and legislatures to adopt this approach likely 
would be difficult.10  Under this approach, legal institutions would be 
encouraged to understand that sex and gender are not binary and, to 
some extent, have been socially constructed.  This approach would 
require a deconstruction of legal sex and gender classification systems 
that seek to classify individuals as either male or female based upon 
sometimes mutable and arbitrary characteristics.11 
These two theoretical alternatives reflect a debate that is occurring 
within some gay, lesbian, and bisexual (GLB) activist communities.  
Some GLB groups have rejected the inclusion of transsexuals in 
proposed legislation that would protect GLBs from discrimination.12  
These groups fear that inclusion of transgendered individuals may result 
in the rejection of legislation that would protect GLBs from sexual 
 
T1, available at 1999 WL-WSJ 24913819; Jodi Wilgoren, Suit Over Estate Claims a 
Widow Is Not a Woman, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at 18; Is It a Boy or a Girl? 
(Discovery Channel television broadcast, Feb. 25, 2001); 20/20: Hermaphrodites, or 
Intersexed People Protest Genital Surgeries on Infants (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 
19, 2002).    
 9. See Greenberg, supra note 2, for a discussion of this approach. 
 10. Until last year, no court or legislature appeared ready to acknowledge that the 
traditional binary sex categories do not accurately reflect the latest scientific 
developments in this area.  Last year, the Kansas Court of Appeals and a family court in 
Australia rejected the traditional binary approach that relied in large part on 
chromosomal structure to define sex.  In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086, 1110 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 2001), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002); Re Kevin (2001) 28 
Fam. L. R. 158 (Austl.).  Most importantly, the Kansas court acknowledged that sex 
classification systems may have to be modified as scientific research advances and 
provides more insight into the nature of sex and gender.  Gardiner, 22 P.3d at 1110.  The 
Kansas decision was reversed by the Kansas Supreme Court.  The Kansas Supreme 
Court accepted binary sex categories and rejected scientific definitions of sex.  In re 
Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 135–36 (Kan. 2002). 
 11. Although numerous sex factors (including chromosomes, gonads, genitalia, 
internal sex organs, hormones, phenotype, and gender self-identity) could be used to 
determine a person’s sex, some courts use only one or two sex features to define sex and 
ignore other factors.  These courts do not provide any compelling justification for the sex 
factor(s) they choose.  See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999); 
Corbett v. Corbett, 1971 P. 83 (Eng. 1970). 
 12. See Chryss Cada, Issue of Transgender Rights Divides Many Gay Activists, 
Transgender Activists Seek a Greater Voice, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 23, 2000, at A8. 
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orientation discrimination.13  Some GLB groups believe that although 
society may be willing to provide some legal protection to individuals 
based upon their sexual orientation, society is not ready to accept laws 
that benefit individuals who cross sex and gender boundaries.14  
Therefore, some GLB activists support the maintenance of a binary sex 
and gender classification system that protects individuals from sexual 
orientation discrimination, but not from discrimination based upon 
transgenderism.15  Many of the largest and most influential gay and 
lesbian activist organizations, however, embrace the inclusion of  
transsexuals in their agendas.16 
These theoretical and practical debates about sex, gender, and sexual 
orientation issues could be enriched by the more developed 
commentaries of those involved in the multiracial debate.  Interesting 
parallels exist between the way that transgendered and multiracial 
people have been treated.  Both groups have been discriminated against 
in many similar ways.  For example, at some point in history, both have 
been (1) denied the right to marry the person of their choice, (2) denied 
the right to use their self-identity as their legal identity, (3) denied the 
right to be free from workplace discrimination, (4) disproportionately 
subjected to hate crimes, and (5) discriminated against by other 
disenfranchised groups that most would generally assume would be 
supportive.  For example, multiracials have at times been rejected by 
Blacks17 and transgendered people have at times been rejected by 
women’s groups and some GLB groups.18 
In addition to having suffered from similar types of discrimination, 
multiracial and transgendered people also have been subjected to similar 
discriminatory legal classification systems.  Race and sex classification 
systems originally were based upon two assumptions: (1) race and sex 
 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See, e.g., National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, About NGLTF: What is 
NGLTF, http://www.ngltf.org/about/index.cfm (last visited July 25, 2002); Parents, 
Families and Friends of Lesbians & Gays, Our Vision, http://pflag.org/about/mission.html 
(last visited July 25, 2002); Gay, Lesbian, Straight Education Network, About Us, 
http://www.glsen.org/templates/about/index.html?section=25 (last visited July 25, 2002). 
 17. See, e.g., Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 
1487, 1495 n.136 (2000); John A. Powell, The Colorblind Multiracial Dilemma: Racial 
Categories Reconsidered, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 789, 802 n.78 (1997). 
 18. See Cada, supra note 12, at A8. 
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are binary,19 and (2) race and sex can be biologically determined.  Racial 
categorization has moved away from these two simplistic assumptions.  
Most scholars and legal institutions now agree that race cannot be 
defined by biological factors and that race has been socially 
constructed.20  Sex classification systems, on the other hand, are still 
based primarily on the assumptions that sex is binary, unambiguous, and 
can be biologically determined, despite scientific research that indicates 
that none of these assumptions are completely accurate.21 
An understanding of the issues that have arisen under a binary race 
classification system may assist legal institutions and gender scholars 
and activists as they seek to understand and modify the current sex 
classification system.  To determine whether sex and gender categories 
should be reconfigured in the same way that race categories are being 
reconceptualized, this Article first briefly summarizes the development 
of our current system of race classification for multiracials.  Next, it 
describes the current sex classification system and the legal problems 
that arise under it.  Finally, this Article explores whether some of the 
 
 19. Sex classification has always been based upon the assumption that sex is 
binary.  The law recognizes only two sexes, male and female.  (Although some 
anthropologists maintain that some isolated societies recognize more than two sex or 
gender categories, no major legal system has established laws governing human behavior 
based upon anything other than a binary system.)  See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 275 
nn. 52–72 and accompanying text.  Many critical race scholars have discussed race 
classification in the United States as if it also has been binary; in other words, two races, 
“White” and “non-White,” exist.  Although laws in the United States have reserved a 
number of benefits to Whites as opposed to non-Whites, society has not necessarily 
accorded the same treatment to all non-Whites.  For example, Thomas Jefferson, writing 
in the late eighteenth century, described Native Americans and Blacks as different races 
with very different characteristics.  See Aaron Schwabach, Jefferson and Slavery, 19 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 63, 82–87 (1997), for a discussion of Jefferson’s views on race.  
Although Jefferson’s writings do not necessarily reflect society’s views on race, as one 
of the primary creators of the United States legal system, his views are noteworthy.  
Evidence also exists that Mulattoes in some parts of the South in the early 1800s were 
treated as a third class, distinct from Blacks.  See Kenneth E. Payson, Comment, Check 
One Box: Reconsidering Directive No. 15 and the Classification of Mixed-Race People, 
84 CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1245–46 (1996).  Some trial evidence from this era, however, 
indicates that many did conceptualize race as binary; some used Indian and White as 
interchangeable terms in contrast to Colored, Black or Negro.  See Ariela J. Gross, 
Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 
108 YALE L.J. 109, 142 n.121 (1998).  In this Article, the term “binary race classification 
system” is used in the following two senses: (1) the United States legal system generally 
did not recognize a mixed race classification, as did other societies such as South Africa 
where Mulattoes lived, were identified, and voted separately from Blacks, and (2) the 
law reserved many of its benefits exclusively for those individuals that it classified as 
White as opposed to non-White.  Although society may have viewed some racial groups 
as inferior or superior to others, the laws generally classified all those who were not of 
White European ancestry as inferior to those who were of such ancestry. 
 20. See infra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
 21. See supra note 19; see also infra notes 87–93 and accompanying text. 
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major issues being discussed by race scholars engaged in the multiracial 
category debate should be considered by legal institutions and scholars 
as they analyze the effect of binary sex and gender classification systems 
on sexual minorities. 
II.  RACE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS 
Historically, the United States has accorded different treatment to 
different races22 and determining a person’s racial status has been a 
major issue throughout United States history.  The earliest race 
classification conflicts centered on those of mixed race ancestry and 
were determinative of a person’s status as a free person or slave.23  
During the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, race 
determination cases were brought to establish whether an individual was 
entitled to the superior legal status generally afforded only to Whites.24  
During the later part of the twentieth century, when race discrimination 
became illegal, race determination actions were brought to determine 
whether a person had a right to recover for race-based discrimination.25 
Race means “different things to different people at different times.”26  
During the nineteenth century, race was assumed to be biologically 
based and generally thought of as binary.27  For multiracial people, the 
factors used to determine race were not consistent.  During the 
nineteenth century, the census bureau, courts, and legislatures used a 
variety of factors to determine race.  For example, during the nineteenth 
century, a person’s race classification on the census was established by 
the census taker’s visual inspection.28  Therefore, the race indicated on 
 
 22. Payson, supra note 19, at 1234. 
 23. See Gross, supra note 19, at 120–21 for an excellent discussion of these early 
race determination cases.  In addition to determining a person’s status as free or slave, 
race determination cases could also affect a number of other issues.  Some race 
determination cases affected criminal defendants’ liability because some criminal laws 
applied only to “Negroes.”  Id. at 120.  Other cases involved the right to inherit, issues of 
legitimacy, liability for slander for questioning a person’s “Whiteness,” the ability to act 
as a witness, and liability of transportation companies for transporting runaway slaves.  
Id. at 120–21. 
 24. See generally, IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996), for an excellent discussion of these cases. 
 25. See infra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
 26. Payson, supra note 19, at 1237; see also LÓPEZ, supra note 24, at xiii (“[R]ace 
is highly contingent, specific to times, places, and situations.”). 
 27. See e.g., Gross, supra note 19, at 142 n. 121. 
 28. See Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, 
African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1185 (1997). 
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the census form was based on the census enumerator’s highly subjective 
assessment of a person’s physical attributes.29  Court decisions during 
this time that determined whether a person was free or a slave relied on a 
number of factors to determine race, including physical attributes, 
ancestral documentation, scientific expert testimony, evidence of 
reputation, and conduct.30  Post-Civil War legislation on this subject 
varied.  State legislatures primarily relied upon ancestry or “blood line” 
to determine race, but the legislators adopted inconsistent ancestral 
fractions that qualified a person as White.31  These contradictory rules 
applied until 1915.  In 1915, the “one-drop” rule, the colloquial 
expression for the rule that one drop of Black blood makes a person 
Black, became the universal law.32  In more formal sociological circles, 
the rule is known as a form of hypodescent.33 
Once the one-drop rule became the generally accepted standard, 
litigation to establish the race of multiracials dramatically declined.34   
During the early part of the twentieth century, many of the race 
determination cases were brought by immigrants seeing naturalization as 
Whites.35  Although these cases did not specifically deal with those who 
 
 29. During the early part of the nineteenth century, the census had only two race 
classifications: White and Negro.  In the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
census added categories for Mulattoes, Chinese, Indian, and Japanese.  U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, 200 YEARS OF U.S. CENSUS TAKING: POPULATION AND HOUSING QUESTIONS, 
1790–1990, at 36 (1989).  Although the addition of these new classifications could 
be interpreted as a rejection of a binary classification system, some commentators 
believe that these multiple categories were a reflection of the statistical 
community’s efforts to create a more nuanced system rather than a shift in society to a 
multiracial model.  See Hickman, supra note 28, at 1183.  Because the census 
enumerators ascertained each person’s race, racial identification could change depending 
on the enumerator’s subjective assessment.  For example, Sally Hemmings and her 
children were identified as Black slaves of Thomas Jefferson during his life, but were 
listed as White by a census taker in 1830.  See Schwabach, supra note 19, at 68.  Even 
the Census Bureau acknowledged that data gathered during this time was of little use.  
U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT ON POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE 
ELEVENTH CENSUS: 1890, PART I, xciii (1890); see also Hickman, supra note 28, at 
1186 n.110. 
 30. See Gross, supra note 19, at 137–76. 
 31. See Payson, supra note 19, at 1248. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Hickman, supra note 28, at 1187. 
 34. Before the adoption of the one-drop rule, litigants of mixed race ancestry had 
an incentive to prove they were White because of the social and political privileges 
afforded to Whites at that time.  With the adoption of the one-drop rule, however, 
litigation declined because proof that even one ancestor was non-White established an 
individual’s race as non-White.  Payson, supra note 19, at 1248–49. 
 35. Laws limiting naturalization based upon race were first adopted in 1790.  See 
LÓPEZ, supra note 24, at 49.  The first race prerequisite case was brought in 1878.  Id.  
From 1878 until 1952, when racial restrictions on naturalization were rejected, courts 
decided fifty-two race determination cases.  Id.  In addition to naturalization laws, other 
laws that discriminated against people based upon their racial status were common in the 
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were of mixed race, the cases help illustrate how the concept of race was 
developing.  These cases continued the patterns established in the 
nineteenth century and used a variety of factors to ascertain whether 
someone was White.36  Most of these cases, however, typically relied on 
common knowledge and scientific evidence to determine who was 
White37 until the United States Supreme Court in 192238 and 192339 
rejected scientific evidence that would have classified too many people 
as Caucasian and therefore entitled to immigrate.  In 1923, the Supreme 
Court adopted a common knowledge standard to establish race.40  This 
common knowledge standard acknowledged that race is largely a 
sociopolitical construct.41 
Most biologists and anthropologists now acknowledge that no 
significant genetic differences exist among the traditionally delineated 
racial groups.42  The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that clear-cut race categories based upon biological differences do not 
exist and instead has accepted that race categories were created by 
society and legal institutions.43  Although some argue that race 
 
early part of the twentieth century.  Disputes over voting restrictions, segregated schools, 
and laws prohibiting interracial marriage and fornication insured the continuance of race 
determination cases well into the twentieth century.  Immigration cases, however, best 
illustrate the approach courts used to define race.  In these cases, the courts had to 
articulate the factors relied upon to determine whether someone qualified as White.  See 
id. at 203–08. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 67. 
 38. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922). In Ozawa, the Supreme Court 
was asked to determine whether a person of Japanese ancestry could become a citizen 
under the naturalization laws.  The Court held that skin color was not an accurate 
indicator of race and instead interpreted the term “White person” to be synonymous with 
“a person of the Caucasian race.”  Id. at 198.  The Court did not define the terms 
“White” or “Caucasian” because it found that persons of Japanese ancestry were 
considered non-Caucasian by legal and scientific authorities.  See id. 
 39. United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923).  In Thind, the Court narrowed its 
Ozawa holding by limiting Caucasians who qualified as White.  Id. at 207–09.  The 
Court also rejected scientific evidence, which would classify Thind, a “high caste Hindu 
of full Indian blood,” as Caucasian in favor of a common knowledge standard.  Id. at 
206, 213–14.  Common knowledge includes what the “average well informed American” 
would consider.  Id. at 211.  In addition the common knowledge standard is also based 
upon the understandings of the original framers of the law.  Id. at 213. 
 40. See id. at 213–15. 
 41. See id. at 214. 
 42. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits 
of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 306 (1995); Payson, supra note 
19, at 1239. 
 43. See, e.g., St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); Shaare 
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classifications are meaningless and should be eliminated from official 
documents,44 our legal system still categorizes individuals by race.45 
An individual’s race may vary, however, depending upon the 
classification system used by the governmental entity at issue.46  For 
example, the race classification indicated on a newborn’s birth certificate 
is based upon a matrilineal system (if the race of the mother is indicated, 
babies of White mothers are White and babies of Black mothers are 
Black).47  The race on the death certificate as established by a third 
party, however, may not conform to the race indicated on the birth 
certificate.48  The census allows people to self-identify their race.  
Although the census does not include a multiracial category, individuals 
can check more than one box or can check a box indicating “other.”49 
Very few race determination cases were brought during the later part of 
the twentieth century.  Courts in these cases acknowledged that race 
classification is “deceptively complex” because of the amorphous 
definition of race and the difficulty of classifying individuals of mixed 
racial ancestry.50  In the few cases that were brought, however, courts 
looked to some of the same evidence that was used in the nineteenth 
century race establishment cases.51  Courts considered visual observation 
of physical characteristics, documentary evidence such as birth 
certificates, self-identity, and community reputation.52  Therefore, although 
 
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987).  In these cases, the Supreme Court 
was asked to determine whether Arabs and Jews were protected under civil rights 
legislation originally passed in the nineteenth century.  The Court decided that even 
though Arabs and Jews could not be considered distinct races under modern scientific 
theory, they could still be protected under the statute if at the time the legislation was 
adopted, they were considered distinct races.  The Court recognized that race is a product 
of culture rather than nature and that definitions of race have changed over time. Al-
Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 610–12; Cobb, 481 U.S. at 617–18. 
 44. Powell, supra note 17, at 790.  
 45. See infra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
 46. See, e.g., Payson, supra note 19, at 1268 (noting a study of birth and death 
certificates that revealed that forty-three percent of Asian and American Indian infants 
had a different race classification on their death certificates than the race classification 
indicated on their birth certificates). 
 47. See Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of “Race” 
in Race-Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1258 (1994). 
 48. See Payson, supra note 19, at 1268. 
 49. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, OMB NO. 0607-0856, 
UNITED STATES CENSUS 2000, FORM D-2, at 3 (2000).   
 50. See, e.g., Perkins v. Lake County Dept. of Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1271 
(N.D. Ohio 1994). 
 51. See, e.g., id. at 1276–79; Doe v. Louisiana, 479 So. 2d 369, 372 (La. Ct. App. 
1985). 
 52. See, e.g., Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1276; Doe, 479 So. 2d at 372.  In Perkins, 
the court considered various factors in determining whether the plaintiff was entitled to 
protection from employment discrimination as an American Indian.  Among these 
factors were official records, self-identification, reputation evidence, and physical 
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race is now considered a sociopolitical construct, it is still legally 
relevant and inconsistently defined. 
III.  SEX CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS 
Although sex classification systems do not affect as many people as 
race classification systems, millions of people do not fit into clear sex 
categories.  The exact incidence of intersexuality and transsexuality is 
not known; some experts place the number as high as four percent of the 
population, while others would fix it as low as one half of one percent.53  
Probably the most well accepted number for intersexed births would be 
approximately one percent of the population,54 which means that in the 
United States alone, over 2.5 million people may be directly affected by 
sex classification.  In addition, potentially another 2.5 million people 
who seek to marry a transgendered person may be indirectly affected. 
 
characteristics.  Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1276–79.  The testimony in this 1994 case was 
remarkably similar to the testimony in the cases decided 150 years earlier.  For example, 
a social worker who worked as an “Indian Affairs Specialist” testified that no matter how 
much “Indians” have been mixed with other races, an observer “just can’t hardly miss 
some feature in them” like their facial features or complexion.  Id. at 1270.  In Doe v. 
Louisiana, plaintiffs wanted their ancestors’ birth certificates that had been issued 
between 1919 and 1941 amended to indicate that the ancestors were White instead of 
“Colored.”  Doe, 479 So. 2d at 371.  The lower court considered evidence regarding 
physical appearance, ancestry, self-identification, and community reputation.  Id. at 372.  
In denying the change of race designation, the court held that the evidence in the record did 
not prove that the ancestors objected to their race classification as “Colored.”  Id. at 372. 
 53. John Money, an expert in the area of intersexuality, estimated that the number 
of interesexed persons may be as high as four percent.  Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five 
Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough, SCIENCES, Mar.–Apr. 1993, at 20, 21.  
Anne Fausto-Sterling, who researched this issue, estimated that the incidence of intersex 
births is in the range of one to two percent.  Anne Fausto Sterling, The Five Sexes 
Revisited, SCIENCES, July–Aug. 2000, at 20.  At a minimum, intersexuals constitute at 
least one tenth of one percent of the population.  See ALICE DOMURAT DREGER, 
HERMAPHRODITES AND THE MEDICAL INVENTION OF SEX 42, 43 (1998).  The exact 
frequency of intersexuality is extremely difficult to determine because some intersexed 
conditions are not apparent at birth and most intersexed individuals are reluctant to 
publicly acknowledge their condition.  See id.  Similarly, the exact incidence of 
transsexuality is unknown.  Some estimates indicate that between three thousand and six 
thousand adults have undergone hormonal and surgical sex modifications in the United 
States and that thirty thousand to sixty thousand additional Americans consider 
themselves candidates.  Some estimates indicate that about ten thousand transsexuals 
currently live in the United States.  DAVID W. MEYERS, THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LAW 
221 (2d ed. 1990). 
 54. See Alice Domurat Dreger, “Ambiguous Sex”—or Ambiguous Medicine?: 
Ethical Issues in the Treatment of Intersexuality, 28 HASTINGS CTR. REP., May–June 
1998, at 24, 42.   
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The manner in which a person’s sex is defined has a number of 
significant legal consequences.  The issues that are of greatest 
importance and that are currently being litigated include the right to 
marry, the right to have an individual’s identity documents list the sex 
that matches the person’s gender self-identity, the ability to state a cause 
of action for employment discrimination, and the right to sex and gender 
autonomy.55  Although some state legislatures have established standards 
for sex determination for transsexuals, a uniform system does not exist, 
and a person’s sex classification may vary by state and by the issue 
being litigated.56 
A.  Marriage 
Since the early 1970s, a number of courts have attempted to develop 
the criteria for determining the legal sex of transgendered people for 
purposes of marriage.57  The two most recently decided cases, Littleton 
v. Prange58 and In re Estate of Gardiner,59 illustrate the importance to 
society of developing a coherent sex classification system.  In both 
cases, a postoperative male-to-female transsexual married a man, and 
both parties to the marriage believed that they had entered into a legal 
heterosexual marriage.  In both cases, the husbands died, and after their 
deaths, third persons contested the validity of the marriage on the basis 
that the wives were legally men.  The courts were asked to establish the 
legal sex of the wives.  The Texas Court of Appeals, the Kansas Court of 
Appeals, and the Kansas Supreme Court used different criteria to 
 
 55. See generally Greenberg, supra note 2.  Sex determination will also affect a 
number of other legal rights and obligations, including the ability to state a gender-based 
claim for violation of one’s constitutional right to equal protection, the ability to 
participate in athletic competitions as a female, the obligation or ability to serve in the 
military, and liability under some criminal statutes.  See id. at 269 & n.20, 273 nn.33–37. 
 56. See CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 6; see generally VAN DER MEIDE, supra 
note 6; Greenberg, supra note 2. 
 57. See, e.g., Von Hoffburg v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1980); In re 
Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 42 
P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002); M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); B. v. 
B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 
(Sup. Ct. 1971); In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc. 2d 6 (Prob. Ct. 1987); Littleton v. Prange, 
9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999); In re Marriage of C. and D. (falsely called C.) (1979) 5 
Fam. L. R. 636 (Austl.); M. v. M. [1994] R.F.L.2d 55 (Can.); C. v. C. [1992] O.R.3d 254 
(Can.); Corbett v. Corbett, 1971 P. 83 (Eng. 1970); Attorney-General v. Otahuhu Family 
Court [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 603; Lim Ying v. Hiok Kian Ming Eric, [1991] 1 SLR 184 
(Sing.); W. v. W., 1976 (2) SALR 308 (S. Afr. W.L.D.); Transgender Ruling, L.A. 
DAILY J., Nov. 26, 1997, at 1 (reporting Orange County Superior Court case, Vecchione 
v. Vecchione, Civ. No. 96D003769).  See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 299–308 for a 
thorough discussion of these cases. 
 58. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999). 
 59. 22 P.3d at 1086. 
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determine the legal sex of the transsexual wives. 
In 1999, in Littleton, the Texas Court of Appeals held that a doctor 
who allegedly committed medical malpractice resulting in the death of 
Jonathan Littleton was not liable to Jonathan’s wife, Christie, under a 
wrongful death statute because Christie was not legally a woman.  The 
court held that the presence of male anatomy at birth and Christie’s XY 
chromosomal structure permanently established Christie’s legal sex as 
male.  The court rejected gender self-identity as a reliable indicator of 
legal sex and ignored recent medical research that indicates that gender 
self-identity likely has a biological basis.60  Instead of relying on 
developments in other disciplines and an analysis of the policy concerns 
that arise in cases involving sex determination, the court chose to rely on 
religious rhetoric and ruled that when God created Christie Littleton, God 
created a man that neither the law nor the medical community could turn 
into a woman.61  Because Christie was born with male anatomy and had 
male (XY) chromosomes, the court ruled that Christie was legally a man.  
Therefore, Christie did not have standing under the wrongful death statute 
because her marriage to her husband Jonathan was an invalid same-sex 
union.62  The Littleton ruling may eventually result in a significant change 
 
 60. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.  A scientific study by Jiang-Ning Zhou, and others, 
indicating a biological basis for transsexualism was available to the Littleton court.  See 
Jiang-Ning Zhou et al., A Sex Difference in the Human Brain and Its Relation to 
Transsexuality, 378 NATURE, Nov. 1995, at 68, 70.  A later study confirmed these earlier 
findings.  See Frank P. M. Kruijver et al., Male-to-Female Transsexuals Have Female 
Neuron Numbers in a Limbic Nucleus, 85 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 
2034 (2000).  These studies indicate that portions of the brains of transsexuals are more 
similar to brains of nontranssexuals of the same gender identity than they are to brains of 
nontranssexuals who of the same anatomical birth sex.  In other words, a portion of a 
male-to-female transsexual’s brain structure more closely resembles a female’s brain 
than a male’s brain.  See Zhou et al., supra; Kruijver et al., supra. 
 61. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224, 231. 
 62. See id.  The decision in Littleton has already been the subject of numerous 
scholarly critiques.  See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, Marriage As a Trade: Bridging the 
Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 88–89 (2001); Taylor 
Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in the 
Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 418 (2001); 
Phyllis Randolph Frye, The International Bill of Gender Rights v. The Cider House 
Rules: Transgenders Struggle with the Courts Over What Clothing They Are Allowed to 
Wear on the Job, Which Restroom They Are Allowed to Use on the Job, Their Right to 
Marry, and the Very Definition of Their Sex, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 133 
(2000); Phyllis Randolph Frye & Alyson Dodi Meiselman, Same-Sex Marriages Have 
Existed Legally in the United States for a Long Time Now, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1031, 1032–
33 (2001); Julie A. Greenberg, When Is a Man a Man, and When Is a Woman a Woman, 
52 FLA. L. REV. 745 (2000); Katrina C. Rose, The Transsexual and the Damage Done: 
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in how gay and lesbian marriages are perceived.  Because of this decision, 
at least three self-identified lesbian couples (in which one of the women is 
a postoperative male-to-female transsexual) have received official 
marriage licenses from Texas government officials.63 
In the other recent case, In re Estate of Gardiner,64 a Kansas trial court 
relied heavily on the Littleton ruling and held that J’Noel Gardiner, the 
wife of a man who died intestate, could not inherit her husband’s estate 
because as a male-to-female transsexual, she could not legally be 
married to a man.65  The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court and rejected the Littleton court’s decision as a “rigid and simplistic 
approach to issues that are far more complex than addressed in that 
opinion.”66  The appellate court instructed the trial court that upon 
remand, it was to determine J’Noel’s sex by considering a number of 
factors, including chromosomal sex, gonadal sex, internal morphologic 
sex, external morphologic sex, hormonal sex, phenotypic sex, assigned 
sex and gender of rearing, and sexual identity.67  The Kansas court 
reviewed current scientific and legal literature and directed the trial court 
to consider not only current literature, but also other criteria as scientific 
research advances the understanding of sex and gender.68  Although the 
Kansas court did not specifically reject a binary sex classification 
system, it did reject a sex classification system based upon outdated and 
stereotypical notions of sex.  It also acknowledged that the legal 
definition of sex may need to be modified as scientific research on the 
nature of sex and gender develop.69 
The Gardiner court of appeals decision is remarkable for a number of 
reasons.  First, the Gardiner court rejected the simplistic approach 
 
The Fourth Court of Appeals Opens Pandoma’s Box by Closing the Door on 
Transsexuals’ Right To Marry, 9 L. & SEXUALITY 1 (1999–2000). 
 63. See Todd Ackerman, Marriage: A Changing Union? Transsexual Wedding 
Shows Gender Can Be a Complex Issue, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 17, 2000, at A1; John 
Gutierrez-Mier, Two More Women Obtain County Marriage License: One Member of 
Couple was Born a Man, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept 21, 2000, at B7, available 
at 2000 WL 27329428; News Roundup: Lesbian Couple Get Marriage License, SAN 
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 12, 2001, at B2, available at 2001 WL 22457047.  
Because Texas does not recognize a postoperative transsexual’s sex as her legal sex, 
Texas law treats a transsexual woman as if she legally is a man.  Therefore, a male-to-
female transsexual’s self-proclaimed lesbian union is considered a legal heterosexual 
marriage between a man and a woman.  As a result, Texas became the first state to 
officially recognize what most of society would identify as a same-sex marriage. 
 64. Gardiner, 22 P.3d at 1086. 
 65. Id. at 1091. 
 66. Id. at 1110. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id.  Approximately one-quarter of the court’s opinion was devoted to what it 
called “The Science” of transgenderism.  Id. at 1093–1100 (quoting Greenberg, supra 
note 2, at 278–92). 
 69. Id. at 1110. 
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adopted by the Littleton court and most other courts that had considered 
this issue.  Second, instead of rigidly applying legal precedent, the 
Gardiner court relied upon scientific developments to set the legal 
standard.70  Finally, and most importantly, the court acknowledged that 
sex and gender do not “lend themselves to precise definition, categories, 
and classifications”71 because not all individuals fit into a “bilateral set 
of classifications.”72  Therefore, the Gardiner court of appeals 
recognized that our binary sex and gender classification system does not 
reflect the complex nature of sex and gender and that sex and gender 
classification systems need to be modified as the scientific community 
advances in its understanding of the nature of sex and gender.73 
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the Kansas Court of Appeals.74  
Instead of relying on scientific definitions of sex, the court relied on 
thirty-year-old definitions in Webster’s Dictionary.75  The court 
determined that a male is “the sex that fertilizes the ovum and begets 
offspring,” while a female is “the sex that produces ova and bears 
offspring.”76 
B.  Identity Documents 
Transgendered individuals may have more than one official sex. The 
federal government allows transsexuals to amend their passports to 
indicate their self-identified sex.77  Some state legislatures have adopted 
 
 70. See id. at 1093–1106.  The court recognized the complexities involved in the 
question that it was being asked to resolve.  It acknowledged: 
Questions of this nature highlight the tension which sometimes exists between 
the legal system, on the one hand, and the medical and scientific communities, on 
the other.  Add to those concerns those whose focus is ethics, religion, lifestyle, 
or human rights, and the significance of a single decision is amplified. 
Id. at 1090. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002). 
 75. Id. at 135 
 76. Id. 
 77. Bulletin from Carmen A. DiPlacido, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, 
Passport Services, to All Regional Directors, All Office Directors, and All Passport 
Services Staff (Passport Bulletin 92-22) (on file with author) (“This bulletin provides a 
more detailed explanation of Passport Services’ policy, and the procedures adjudicators 
are to follow in cases where an applicant requests a different gender on the passport 
application form than on the applicant’s citizenship evidence.”). 
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a similar rule for birth certificates.78  In other states, the sex established 
at birth by the birth attendant remains a person’s legal sex regardless of 
any later physical changes.79  In some states, a person’s birth certificate 
may indicate a sex different from the sex indicated on the driver’s 
license because frequently the Department of Motor Vehicles is more 
liberal in allowing amendments to the sex marker on driver’s licenses.80  
Identity documents are significant because the sex indicated on the 
identity document may establish a person’s ability to marry in a 
particular sex role.81 
C.  Right to State a Claim for Discrimination 
Before 1999, courts consistently ruled that transgendered people could 
not state a cause of action under Title VII82 for employment 
discrimination if they were discriminated against based upon their 
transgendered status.83  Federal courts consistently held that Title VII 
discrimination “because of sex” includes discrimination against women 
because they are women and men because they are men, but does not 
include discrimination against transsexuals because of their 
transsexuality.84  Some cases decided within the last few years, however, 
 
 78. See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 308–10. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. at 315.  The Erickson Educational Foundation published the results of a 
survey it conducted.  Erickson Educ. Found., Information and Guidelines for 
Transsexuals, at http://www.sexuality.org/l/incoming/eeetrans.html (last visited July 25, 
2002).  According to this study conducted in 1974, thirty-four of the Department of 
Motor Vehicles offices that responded to the survey allowed postoperative transsexuals 
to change the sex designation on their driver’s licenses.  Id. 
 81. See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 309 n.341 and accompanying text.  The most 
recent states to address this issue, Texas and Kansas, found, however, that the current sex 
indicated on a person’s birth certificate may not be dispositive of the sex role in which 
the person can marry.  See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 136–37 (Kan. 2002); 
Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999). 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment because of . . . sex . . . .   
Id. 
 83. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663–64 (9th Cir. 
1977); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Voyles v. 
Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff’d mem., 570 
F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978); Powell v. Read’s Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D.Md. 1977); 
Grossman v. Bernards Township Bd. Of Educ., No. 74-1904, 1975 WL 302 (D.N.J. 
1975), aff’d mem., 538 F.2d 319 (3rd Cir. 1976); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Co., 850 
F. Supp. 284, 286–87 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Doe v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 84-3296, 1985 WL 
9446 (D.D.C. 1985); Terry v. E.E.O.C., No. 80-C-408, 1980 WL 334 (E.D. Wis. 1980).  
For a thorough discussion of these cases, see Greenberg, supra note 2, at 318–22. 
 84. Before 1999, only one federal district court held that transsexuals are entitled to 
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indicate that some federal courts may consider expanding sex 
discrimination under Title VII to include discrimination based upon 
gender nonconformity.85  If courts adopt a gender nonconformity approach 
to employment discrimination, transgendered people will receive 
protection from employment discrimination based upon their 
transgendered status.86 
D.  Right to Autonomy 
Medical institutions also play a significant role in establishing the 
sex of thousands of intersexed infants who are born with mixed sex 
markers.87  The medical community bases the sex assignment of 
intersexed infants on the following long-held assumptions that are 
now being questioned by researchers in a variety of disciplines.88   
 
Title VII protection if they are discriminated against based upon their status as a 
transsexual.  Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 839 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev’d, 742 
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).  Before 1999, one state specifically rejected the federal courts’ 
narrow interpretation of Title VII and found that transsexuals were protected under its city 
and state antidiscrimination statutes.  See Rentos v. Oce-Office Sys., 1996 WL 737215 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (using New York law); Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 396 
(Sup. Ct. 1995).  Since 1999, a number of courts have implied that they may interpret Title 
VII to include discrimination against transgendered people.  See infra note 85. 
 85. See, e.g., Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084–85 (7th Cir. 
2000); Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 864–65 (8th Cir. 1999); Doe v. 
Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 592–94 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated by 523 U.S. 1001 (1998); 
Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090–93 (D. Minn. 2000); Ray 
v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 86. See supra note 85.  In addition, some courts have indicated a willingness to 
protect gender nonconformists under other statutes that prohibit sex or gender 
discrimination.  See, e.g., Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st 
Cir. 2000); Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1093–96 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1198–1205 (9th Cir. 2000); Enriquez v. W. Jersey 
Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 377 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 87. The birth attendant typically assigns a sex to a newborn based upon the 
appearance of the infant’s external genitalia.  If the external genitalia appear 
unambiguous, no further tests of the other sex factors are typically considered.  In 
many intersexed conditions, the external genitalia are not harmonious with the other 
biological sex factors.  For example, an infant might have typical female external 
genitalia while also having other biological sex factors such as male chromosomes and 
gonads.  The other factors may be ignored if the birth attendant is unaware of this 
incongruence.  See Dreger, supra note 54, at 27–28. 
 88. See, e.g., Milton Diamond & H. Keith Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment at 
Birth: Long-Term Review and Clinical Implications, 151 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRIC & 
ADOLESCENT MED. 298 (1997); Dreger, supra note 54; Suzanne J. Kessler, The Medical 
Construction of Gender: Case Management of Intersexed Infants, SIGNS, Autumn 1990, 
at 3; William Reiner, To Be Male or Female—That Is the Question, 151 ARCHIVES OF 
PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 224 (1997); Justine M. Schober, Feminizing 
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Most physicians presume that gender is bendable.  Based upon the 
belief that gender identity is established more by nurture than by nature, 
doctors have surgically and hormonally altered an infant’s anatomical 
sex markers to the sex they believe is most appropriate based upon 
anatomical features rather than likely gender self-identity.89 
Furthermore, the medical community bases gender assignment on two 
stereotyped assumptions about the essence of manhood and womanhood.  
First, physicians assume that men must have a penis that is capable of 
penetrating a vagina and long enough to allow the man to urinate while 
standing.  Therefore, if an XY infant is born with a penis that is less than 
2.5 centimeters when fully stretched, the XY infant is surgically and 
hormonally turned into a girl, despite the fact that this treatment may 
deprive the person of the ability to reproduce as an adult male and the 
fact that the child’s eventual gender identity may well be male.90  On the 
other hand, the medical community typically assumes that the essence of 
womanhood is the presence of a vagina with the capacity to be 
penetrated, a clitoris that is not too large, and the ability to reproduce.  
Therefore, if an XX infant is born with a phallus that looks more like a 
penis than a clitoris, doctors will reduce the size of the phallus and 
recommend that the child be raised as a girl,91 despite the fact that the 
surgical treatment may result in a loss of erotic response.92 
 Finally, the medical community presumes that individuals who grow 
up with atypical looking genitalia or any ambiguity about their sex and 
gender will suffer severe psychological trauma.  Therefore, doctors 
surgically sculpt acceptable looking genitalia and sometimes lie to the 
parents or recommend that the parents lie to their children about their 
 
Genitoplasty for Intersex, in MARK D. STRINGER ET AL., PEDIATRIC SURGERY AND 
UROLOGY; LONG TERM OUTCOMES 549 (1998). 
 89. This type of surgery is performed on intersexed infants with ambiguous 
genitalia as well as male infants who suffered some type of trauma to the penis so that 
the penis was then considered to be inadequate for sexual penetration.  See, e.g., Diamond 
& Sigmundson, supra note 88, at 298; Sally Lehrman, Woman, STANFORD TODAY ONLINE, 
May–June 1997, http://Stanford.edu/dept/news/stanfordtoday/ed/9705/9705fea401.shtml (last 
visited July 25, 2002); R.L. Rothstein & R.M. Couch, Management of Intersex: 
Approach to Ambiguous Genitalia, BRIT. COLUM. MED. J., Aug. 1992, at 493, 495. 
 90. See Dreger, supra note 54, at 28.  If the penis is considered adequate but does 
not have the appearance of a normal penis, surgeons may perform repeated operations to 
make the penis appear normal.  See id. at 28.  Often, infants are subjected to painful 
invasive surgery to allow the child to stand while urinating.  The result of such surgery 
may be severe scarring and inability to experience sexual sensation.  See PHYLLIS 
BURKE, GENDER SHOCK: EXPLODING THE MYTHS OF MALE AND FEMALE 221–28 (1996) 
(discussing case studies). 
 91. See Dreger, supra note 54, at 28. 
 92. Cheryl Chase, Surgical Process Is Not the Answer to Intersexuality, in 
INTERSEX IN THE AGE OF ETHICS 147, 151–52 (Alice Domurat Dreger ed., 1999). 
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children’s intersexed conditions.93 
As illustrated by these examples, sex and gender, to some extent, are 
being created by legal and medical institutions.  Physicians create sex for 
intersexed infants according to stereotypes about the essential nature of 
manhood (ability to penetrate) and womanhood (ability to procreate).  
Legal institutions typically define sex according to one sex marker rather 
than thoroughly analyzing all the factors that could be used to determine 
sex.  Furthermore, legal institutions traditionally define the term “sex” to 
exclude gender nonconformists as a protected classification under 
employment discrimination legislation.  How sex is legally defined and 
medically established will have a profound effect on transgendered 
people’s ability to marry, travel, and be free from discriminatory 
employment practices.  Furthermore, if current medical practices for sex 
determination are allowed to continue, intersexuals’ rights to personal 
autonomy will continue to be subjected to irreversible and unnecessary 
infringement.  Therefore, a thorough analysis of our current system for 
sex determination is essential. 
IV.  RECONCEPTUALIZING RACE AND SEX 
As indicated in Part III, race and sex were originally considered binary 
and biologically determinable.94  Many race scholars have worked to 
educate legal institutions and society about the nonbinary, nonbiological 
nature of race in the hope that a deconstruction of race categories will 
lead to a diminishing of race-based discrimination.  Race scholars and 
activists are debating a number of interesting issues that have resulted 
from the deconstruction of race categories.  An understanding of some of 
the issues being debated within the scholarly race community may help 








 93. See, e.g., Lehrman, supra note 89, at 49; Rothstein & Couch, supra note 89, at 
495. 
 94. Supra note 19 and accompanying text; see discussion supra Part III. 
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A.  Does Rejection of Race as Biologically Based and Acceptance                      
of Race as Socially Constructed Help or Hurt Racial                    
Minorities?   Would a Similar Deconstruction                                                
of Sex and Gender Categories Help                                                           
Sexual Minorities? 
Most people have criticized our historical racial system, which was 
based upon the one-drop rule, because of its origin in a racist society.  A 
common presumption exists that because race categories were designed 
by racists, whose goal was to discriminate against Blacks, the rules 
resulted only in harm to Blacks.95  Therefore, many race scholars argue 
that historical biological definitions of race must be rejected based upon 
their racist origins.96  Some of these scholars believe that acceptance of 
race as a sociopolitical construct will benefit minorities.97 
Other race scholars argue that despite their racist origins, the binary 
race classification system and the one-drop rule have helped to form a 
strong Black identity that in the long run helped Blacks form a common 
bond to combat racism.98  Therefore, some race scholars believe that the 
traditional classifications should be maintained if the goal of the 
classification is to protect racial minorities from discriminatory treatment.  
During the past decade, the acceptance of race as a social construct has 
been used by some conservatives to support the position that society 
should dismantle programs that benefit groups that historically have been 
subjected to discrimination.99  These conservatives argue that because 
race is socially constructed, society would benefit most if it became 
color-blind and eliminated all racial categorization, regardless of its 
purpose.100  Therefore, acceptance of race as a sociopolitical construct 
may result in less protection for groups that historically have been 
disadvantaged. 
Sex and race are clearly not analogous in relationship to this question.  
 
 95. See Hickman, supra note 28, at 1187–88. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. at 1165–66. 
 98. See, e.g., id. at 1187–88; Payson, supra note 19, at 1244–45. 
 99. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 17, at 790.  Conversely, some scholars assert that 
the traditional census categories must be maintained to enforce antidiscrimination laws 
and safeguard voting rights, job opportunities, and school integration plans.  See 
Hickman, supra note 28, at 1254 (citing Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Census, 
Statistics, and Postal Personnel of the Comm. on the Post Office and Civil Service, 103d 
Cong. 182 (1993)). 
 100. See, e.g., Michael Omi, Racial Identity and the State: The Dilemmas of 
Classification, 15 L. & INEQ. 7, 22 (1997); Payson, supra note 19, at 1286–87; Powell, 
supra note 17, at 790; Black? White? Asian? Why Not Just American?, NEWS & REC. 
(Greensboro, N.C.), July. 10, 1994, at F2; Clint Bolick, Discriminating Liberals, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 6, 1996, at A15. 
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First, the sex classification system, although created in part by legal and 
medical institutions based upon stereotypes about men and women,101 has a 
strong biological basis.  Second, the sex classification system has not 
created a common bond among sexual minorities.102 Therefore, it is most 
likely that the acceptance of sex as in part socially constructed should 
lead to greater acceptance of all sexual minorities.  It is possible, 
however, that the socially constructed aspect of sex could be used to 
justify the dismantling of programs designed to protect against gender-
based discrimination. 
B.  Does the Movement in Favor of a Multiracial Category Help                
or Hurt Racial Minorities?  Would Acceptance of a                       
Transgendered Category Help or Hurt                                                     
Sexual Minorities? 
Those in favor of a multiracial category argue that such a category 
would acknowledge the increasing number of children who are born into 
mixed race families and recognize that current race categories do not 
account for the identity and experiences of multiracial people.103  Some 
also argue that increasing the number of race categories to include 
multiracials will eventually destroy the Black and White racial 
dichotomy that creates otherness and subordination.104 
Other scholars assert that acceptance of a multiracial category creates 
definitional as well as practical problems.105  First, the acceptance of a 
multiracial category implies an acceptance that race is based upon blood 
lines, an approach that has been completely discredited.106  Furthermore, 
the category itself would be impossible to define.  If it includes anyone 
of mixed heritage, then the majority of people in the United States would 
be defined as multiracial and the category would become meaningless.107  
 
 101. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 
 102. See Cada, supra note 12, at A8. 
 103. See Bijan Gilanshah, Multiracial Minorities: Erasing the Color Line, 12 L. & 
INEQ. 183, 197 (1993); Payson, supra note 19, at 1236; Julie C. Lythcott-Haims, Note, 
Where Do Mixed Babies Belong? Racial Classification in American and Its Implications 
for Transracial Adoption, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 542 (1994). 
 104. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Underrepresentation of Minorities in the 
Legal Profession: A Critical Race Theorist’s Perspective, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1005, 1046–
47 (1997). 
 105. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 17, at 798. 
 106. See, e.g., id. 
 107. See, e.g., id. 
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More importantly, some argue that a multiracial category could be used 
as a buffer category to further distinguish Whites from Blacks and that 
acceptance of a multiracial category will do nothing to reject White as 
the superior category.108  Furthermore, creation of new race categories 
could act to break down long-standing alliances between people of color 
by splitting them into smaller and meaningless subjective groups.109  
Finally, some are concerned that acceptance of a mixed race status will 
negatively affect civil rights gains.110 
Activists, as well as sex and gender scholars, probably do not need to 
be concerned that acceptance of a transgendered category could 
potentially harm some sexual minorities.  The problems that could 
potentially arise under a multiracial system would be unlikely to occur 
under a multigendered system.  First, sex, unlike race, does have a 
biological basis. Although a return to blood lines to determine race 
would not reflect reality, biological factors help determine a person’s 
sex.  Second, the same definitional problems would not arise.  Although 
most people in our society have a mixed heritage that would justify 
inclusion in a multiracial category, the number of transgendered people 
is more limited and easier to define.  Third, although acceptance of a 
multiracial category may serve to create greater divisions between 
Whites and Blacks, the same is not true in gender and sexual orientation 
relationships.  The White and Black dichotomy is not analogous to the 
male and female dichotomy or the heterosexual and homosexual 
dichotomy.  Acceptance of a transgendered category will not lead to the 
further subordination of women or gays and lesbians.  Finally, the 
relationship among the different groups of sex and gender minorities is 
not the same as the relationship between multiracials and Blacks.  
Splintering multiracials from Blacks may lead to a breakdown of racial 
alliances.  Historically, similar alliances have not existed between 
transgendered groups and women or transsexual groups and gays and 
lesbians.111 
Limiting sex categories to male and female based solely on anatomy 
and ignoring gender identity does not account for the identity and 
experiences of transsexuals and intersexuals.  Furthermore, educating 
society about the nonbinary nature of sex and gender will likely lead to 
greater acceptance of all sexual minorities, including gays and lesbians.  
If legal institutions and society understand that sex, gender, and sexual 
orientation are to some extent socially constructed, nonbinary, and often 
 
 108. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 17, at 1523–24. 
 109. See, e.g., Cindy Rodriguez, Civil Rights Groups Wary of Census Data on Race, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 8, 2000, at A1. 
 110. See, e.g., Payson, supra note 19, at 1236. 
 111. See Cada, supra note 12, at A8. 
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conflated, then the man and woman, masculine and feminine, and 
heterosexual and homosexual dichotomies necessarily become blurred.112 
Some GLB activist groups are concerned, however, that including 
transsexuals in the GLB agenda will increase the probability that proposed 
legislation designed to protect gays and lesbians from discrimination 
will be rejected.  For example, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
(ENDA) specifically bans employment discrimination based upon actual 
or perceived sexual orientation.113  Although transgendered groups have 
fought for inclusion in ENDA by proposing that the bill be amended to 
ban discrimination based on actual or perceived gender identity, some 
GLB groups oppose the amendment.114  These groups maintain that 
providing protection based on gender identity will result in a loss of 
support for the bill among a number of members of Congress who 
currently support the proposed legislation.  Therefore, they argue that the 
binary categories should be accepted until protective legislation has been 
adopted to protect GLBs.  They believe that challenging binary sex 
categories will lead to more immediate harm than good for GLBs.  
Therefore, some GLB activist groups are unlikely to support the 
deconstruction of sex and gender categories and the addition of a 
transgendered category. 
C.  Should Race Be Determined Solely by Self-Identity or Should             
Race Be Objectively Defined?  Should Sex Be Determined                 
Solely by Gender Identity or Should It Be Defined                                       
by “Objective” Criteria? 
Some race scholars believe that people should be able to identify their 
own race based upon the ideology of individualism.115  Also, self-
identification is probably a better system than a state classification 
system that is based upon insignificant criteria.116  Others argue that 
 
 112. See Valdes, supra note 3, at 8–10. 
 113. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2001, H.R. 2692, 107th Cong. §§ 
3(9), 4(a)–(f) (2001).   
 114. See Frye, supra note 62, at 177; Cada, supra note 12, at A8. 
 115. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 17, at 799. 
 116. For example, Louisiana refused to change an individual’s birth certificate from 
Colored to White.  Although she produced evidence consisting of her mother’s death 
certificate designating her mother as White, her father’s baptismal certificate designating 
her father as White, and evidence that her grandmother had been adjudged White, the 
court ruled the evidence was insufficient to establish her right to register as White 
beyond any doubt.  State ex rel. Pritchard v. La. State Bd. of Health, 198 So. 2d 490 (La. 
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allowing self-identity to control one’s legal race may result in a push by 
those of mixed race to claim the status that will most privilege them.117  
Furthermore, a self-identity approach fails to acknowledge that society 
plays a critical role in establishing race.118 
Similar concerns about utilizing self-identity to define sex are raised 
by courts.  Courts that rejected a self-identity definition indicated their 
fear that transsexuals may use such a system to enter into a same-sex 
marriage or to commit fraud.119  Now that many institutions are moving 
to a color-blind standard and affirmative action programs are being 
dismantled, the legal implications of race classification are not as 
significant as they used to be.  Sex classification, however, still has a 
profound effect on fundamental rights, including the ability to marry.  
Therefore, allowing individuals to identify their own sex will have 
greater legal consequences and fears of fraud may provide a greater 
barrier to moving to a self-identification system for sex classification. 
D.  Should Race Be Defined According to One Standard for All 
Purposes?  Should Sex Be Defined According to One                         
Standard for All Purposes? 
Some race scholars argue that race derives its meaning from the 
context in which it is being examined and that the concept of race is 
therefore constantly shifting.120  These scholars believe that we cannot 
have one definition of race that can be used in all legal contexts.121  The 
law must distinguish between the use of race to stereotype minorities and 
promote racism, as opposed to the use of race to combat discriminatory 
practices and build racial solidarity.122  These scholars argue that race can 
be defined by biological, social, and historical factors and that depending 
upon the context in which the legal issue is being raised, sometimes race 
conscious and sometimes race neutral remedies are appropriate.123 
Similarly, sex and gender scholars need to understand that 
deconstructing sex categories and focusing on the nonbinary, socially 
constructed aspects of sex and gender may not automatically lead to 
 
Ct. App. 1967). 
 117. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 42, at 337; cf. Perkins v. Lake County Dep’t of 
Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1271 (N.D. Ohio 1994). 
 118. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 17, at 799. 
 119. See, e.g., Hartin v. Dir. of the Bureau of Records and Statistics, Dep’t of 
Health, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517–18 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 
N.Y.S.2d 319, 322 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
 120. See, e.g., Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Book Note, Navigating the Topology of 
Race, 46 STAN. L. REV. 747, 779 (1994). 
 121. See id. at 774. 
 122. See id. at 779. 
 123. See id. at 779–80. 
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greater protection for sexual minorities in all circumstances.  For 
example, although gender activists may want same-sex marriages 
legalized, given the strong opposition to gay and lesbian marriages that 
is prevalent throughout much of society and most legal institutions,124 it 
may be necessary for the near future to accept traditional binary 
categories in marriage litigation.  To instead emphasize the nonbinary 
nature of sex may lead to the barring of transgendered people from 
marrying anyone at all.125  Supporting a binary system in which sex is 
based on gender self-identity is probably the most effective way to 
promote transgendered marital rights.  For purposes of marriage, it may 
be important to emphasize that gender self-identity appears to have a 
biological basis and is just as valid an indicator of sex as are 
chromosomes.126  For antidiscrimination and hate crimes legislation, 
however, under our current binary sex and gender model, discrimination 
against transgendered people is generally considered legal.127  Unless 
these groups are specifically listed in the statute, courts typically fail to 
protect them from discrimination based upon their transgendered status 
or their sexual orientation.  Therefore, to protect sexual minorities from 
discrimination, the nonbinary socially constructed aspects of sex must be 
emphasized so that the definition of the word “sex” in sex discrimination 
law is expanded to include transsexuals and intersexuals. 
 
 124. No state in the United States allows people of the same sex to marry.  See 
Greenberg, supra note 2, at notes 204–08 and accompanying text.  In addition, Congress, 
when it adopted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), defined marriage for federal 
purposes as the “legal union between one man and one woman . . . and the word ‘spouse’ 
refers only to a person of the opposite sex . . . .”  1 U.S.C. § 7 (2002).  Thus far, all 
courts (other than courts in Hawaii and Vermont) that have been asked to resolve the 
issue have ruled that same-sex marriages are not allowed.  Courts in Hawaii and 
Vermont ruled that same sex couples were entitled to the same rights as heterosexual 
couples, but neither state has recognized same-sex marriages.  See Greenberg, supra note 
62, at 760 n. 148–49 (discussing decisions in Hawaii and Vermont).    
 125. For example, in one reported Australian case in which the validity of the 
marriage of an intersexual was at issue, the court invalidated his marriage. See In re 
Marriage of C. and D. (falsely called C.) (1979) 5 Fam. L. R. 636 (Austl.).  The court 
analyzed the controlling legislation that required that marriage be limited to one man and 
one woman and implied that because the intersexed husband was neither a man nor a 
woman, he could not legally marry anyone at all.  Id.  It is doubtful that a current United 
States court would take this approach, but is an issue that may need to be addressed. 
 126. The long-term strategy that would benefit all sexual minorities, including gays 
and lesbians, would be to push for a deconstruction of the categories man and woman so 
that legal marriages could not be limited to members of the opposite sex. 
 127. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.   
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V.  CONCLUSION 
As sex and gender scholars and activists seek to shape the 
development of our sex classification system, they must be mindful of 
the problems that can arise from deconstructing sex categories and 
adopting a single unified standard for determining sex.  Race theorists 
and activists have learned that deconstructing race classification systems 
and moving to an acceptance of race as a sociopolitical construct can be 
used to promote racial harmony as well as to dismantle programs that are 
designed to combat race discrimination.  Similarly, as gender scholars 
and activists seek to break down sex and gender classification 
stereotypes and assumptions, they need to be aware of the ways in which 
deconstructing sex categories can be used to promote discrimination 
against, as well as greater acceptance of, sexual minorities.  Just as the 
law may need to utilize historical, cultural, and biological definitions of 
race depending on the legal context, gender scholars may need to 
emphasize the biological, social, and nonbinary nature of sex and 
gender, depending upon the context in which sex is being defined. 
 
